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Abstract 
 This paper discusses serious drawbacks of existing knowledge in macroeconomics 
and finance in explaining and predicting economic and financial phenomena. Complexity 
science is proposed as an alternative approach to be used in order to better understand how 
economy and financial market work. This paper argues that understanding characteristics of 
complex system could greatly benefit financial analysts, financial regulators, as well as 
macroeconomic policy makers. 
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“We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of thinking that created them.” 
        - Albert Einstein 
 
I. Introduction 
  Macroeconomics and finance have been widely criticized by a number of scientific 
scholars as well as economists for the past several decades regarding drawbacks and 
limitations of models and assumptions used in order to analyze, explain, as well as predict 
macroeconomic and financial phenomena.
1
 However, those criticisms have hardly affected 
the ways in which orthodox economists and financial analysts use to analyze macroeconomic 
and financial issues.
2
 Worse, if one asks orthodox economists and financial analysts about 
shortcomings and limitations of models and assumptions used in macroeconomics and 
finance, one might be surprised to find out that many of them have not even come across such 
criticisms. Or if they have, those orthodox economists and financial analysts still insist that 
their models and assumptions are useful framework and keep on using them despite the fact 
that these models have repeatedly failed to explain and predict macroeconomic and financial 
events.  
 Ironically, this trend seems to go on unnoticed by policy makers who normally take 
advices from orthodox economists and financial analysts. It is as if an engineer had used a 
model along with its assumptions in designing and constructing ten bridges and all bridges 
                                                          
1
 For example, please see von Hayek (1974), Waldrop (1992), Bak (1996), Ormerod (2006), 
Beinhocker (2007), Colander et al. (2008), Mandelbrot and Hudson (2008), Buiter (2009), Farmer and 
Geanakoplos (2009), Krugman (2009), Caballero (2010), Düppe (2010), Helbing and Balietti (2010), 
Kirman (2010), Orrell (2010), Farmer (2011), Ball (2012), Haldane and Nelson (2012), Ormerod 
(2012), Arthur (2013), Buchanan (2013), Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Shubik (2013), Taleb (2013), 
Sitthiyot (2014), Taleb (2014), Arthur (2015), Fernandez (2015), and Helbing (2015).  
2
 For example, please see Whitelaw (2000), Pongsaparn (2008), Tanboon (2008), Bekaert et al. 
(2009), Drechsler and Yaron (2009), Bonomo et al. (2010), Sbordone et al. (2010), Foerster et al. 
(2013), Foxley (2013), Davig and Foerster (2014), Durongkaveroj (2014), and Sironi (2015). 
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built in the past collapsed and the same engineer is still being trusted and commissioned to 
design and build the eleventh bridge!  In sciences, if models and assumptions have flaws in a 
sense that they cannot explain and predict empirical observations, good scientists will search 
for better models and/or change assumptions until they find models and assumptions that 
could explain and predict real world phenomena. Unfortunately, this is not the case for 
orthodox macroeconomics and modern finance since there has not been any significant 
changes since the U.S. financial crisis in 2007. The knowledge is still being taught in the 
universities and being used in formulating economic and financial policies. This paper tries to 
argue that we should abandon them due to their serious drawbacks.
3
 It then discusses and 
raises the importance of an alternative approach that could help scientifically analyze, 
explain, and predict macroeconomic and financial phenomena. 
 This paper is organized into five sections. Following the introduction, Section II 
discusses five selected but critical shortcomings of existing knowledge in macroeconomics 
and finance. Despite a number of well-known scientists as well as many economists have 
already pointed out in many occasions as mentioned above, this paper believes it is worth to 
reiterate the importance of this issue. The drawbacks of knowledge in macroeconomics and 
finance would help lay the ground for Section III where the paper introduces the concept of 
science of complexity as an alternative approach and describes how it could help us 
understand the nature of financial market and economic system. The implications of 
complexity science for macroeconomic and financial uncertainty management are discussed 
in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes and suggests future direction for macroeconomics 
and finance. 
 
                                                          
3
 Thaler (2015) suggests not to discarding wrong theories, just do not treat them as true. 
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II. Drawbacks in Macroeconomics and Finance 
 The main shortcomings in macroeconomics and finance have to do with models and 
assumptions. For macroeconomics, the model that is being widely used by economists to 
analyze and forecast the effects of economic policies on the economy is known as the 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium or DSGE model.
4
 This model has been heavily 
criticized by many scientists outside the field of economics and by a number of economists 
that many assumptions imposed in the DSGE model are not consistent with empirical 
observations.
5
 This paper chooses to discuss three main assumptions imposed in the DSGE 
model that do not fit with what happen in reality, namely, the equilibrium state of the 
economy, the external random shocks as the only factor that could affect the system, and the 
representative agent with rational expectations.  
 As its name suggests, the DSGE model assumes an equilibrium state of the economy. 
Casti (2010) illustrates that, in the real world, an economy where supply and demand are in 
balance never happens even approximately. According to Helbing (2015), economic system 
is unlikely to be in equilibrium at any point in time. Rather, it is expected to show a complex 
non-equilibrium dynamics. Ball (2012) notes that the equilibrium assumption originates from 
microeconomic theory as an analogue of equilibrium physical systems such as gases which 
have stable and unchanging states. The physical sciences, however, have long moved on to 
describe non-equilibrium process such as weather system but economics has not. According 
                                                          
4
 Please see Tanboon (2008) and Sbordone et al. (2010) for general description of the DSGE model. 
5
 For example, please see Ormerod (2006), Beinhocker (2007), Colander et al. (2008), Buiter (2009), 
Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009), Krugman (2009), Caballero (2010), Düppe (2010), Kirman (2010), 
Orrell (2010), Farmer (2011), Ball (2012), Ormerod (2012), Arthur (2013), Buchanan (2013), 
Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Shubik (2013), Arthur (2015) and Helbing (2015). Ormerod (2006) refers 
to Kenneth Arrow, the winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel in 1972, who regards the DSGE model as being empirically refuted. Düppe (2010) 
interprets the banquet speech given by Gerard Debreu in 1983 upon receiving the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel as acknowledging the irrelevance of the 
general equilibrium theory and real world economic content. 
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to Ball, the equilibrium assumption is one of the key reasons why the DSGE model not only 
failed to forecast major fluctuations such as slumps and crashes but also motivated the 
disastrous suggestions by many politicians and economists before the 2007 U.S. financial 
crisis that such crises had been banished for good.
6
 In addition, Arthur (2015) points out that, 
by assuming an equilibrium state of the economy, economists place a very strong filter on 
what we can see in the economy. Under equilibrium, by definition, there is no scope for 
improvement or further adjustment, no scope for exploration, no scope for creation, and no 
scope for transitory phenomena. Thus, anything in the economy that takes adjustment, 
namely, adaptation, innovation, structural change, and history itself, must be bypassed or 
dropped from the theory. The result may be a beautiful structure but it lacks authenticity, 
aliveness, and creation. It is no wonder why Charles Goodhart, the former Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England, articulates that “the DSGE model only works when 
nothing happens [emphasis added].”7 If we look around the world in which we live, we do 
observe things continue to unfold and hardly stay in equilibrium as assumed in the DSGE 
model.
8
 
 While the DSGE model assumes equilibrium state of the economy, it does allow the 
economic system to be out of equilibrium. However, anything that forces the economy away 
from equilibrium, according to this model, must come from outside of the system only. In the 
DSGE model, when the economy is perturbed by an external shock, it would adjust towards a 
                                                          
6
 Ben Bernanke, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, states in his remarks at the 
meetings of the Eastern Economic Association in Washington, D.C. on February 20, 2004 that the 
economic landscape over the past twenty years has faced stability and “great moderation.” 
7
 Personal comment given at the Bank of Thailand International Symposium, Bangkok, October 16, 
2010. 
8
 This is consistent with the second law of thermodynamics which states that systems tend to move 
from order to disorder as measured by entropy. Beinhocker (2007) argues that, given the fact that 
economic system exists in the real physical world, therefore, it must obey the second law of 
thermodynamics as everything else in the universe does. Beinhocker also refers to Sir Arthur 
Eddington, the British Astrophysicist, who remarks that “if your theory is found to be against the 
second law of Thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in 
deepest humiliation.” 
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new stable equilibrium.
9
 In the absence of an external shock, supply and demand would 
always be in balance, all markets would clear, and prices would be stable (Ball, 2012). This 
model is not capable of generating shock from the inside that causes the system to fluctuate.  
 Kirman (2010) argues that, by and large, the fluctuations of the economy are the result 
of interaction among agents who make up the system and not due to some exogenous shocks. 
Kirman also refers to Sornette (2003) who makes a similar point that a stock market crash is 
not the result of short-term exogenous events but rather involves a long-term endogenous 
build-up with exogenous events acting merely as triggers. The idea that endogenous factors 
could gradually cause the system out of equilibrium is not entirely new, however. It has long 
been recognized and studied by many disciplines such as physics, biology, ecology, and 
sociology. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in such systems, abrupt changes are not 
unusual and could be the result of spontaneous emergence of extreme events in self-
organizing systems (Sornette, 2003). At the time when change occurs, normally with a long 
period of delay, the system may switch rapidly from one state to another, the so-called phase 
transition, and this would be dependent on endogenous factors comprising the system and not 
necessarily on some major exogenous shocks. By assuming an outside force as the only 
factor that could push the economy away from equilibrium, the DSGE model therefore does 
not allow one to analyze the dynamic process of the interaction among endogenous factors 
that could gradually self-organize, cause such a change as phase transition, and push the 
economic system out of equilibrium. 
                                                          
9
 Helbing and Balietti (2010) argue that, in a dynamic system of highly non-linearly interacting and 
coupled variables like an economy, there is no guarantee that the system would converge to a new 
stable equilibrium. It is also possible that the system would have multi-equilibria. In addition, the 
existence of equilibrium does not necessarily imply that it is stable where the system will converge to 
this solution. The stable solution could be a focal point with orbiting solutions as explained by Lotka-
Volterra equations or it could be unstable and give rise to a limit cycle or a chaotic solution.  
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 In addition, the DSGE model assumes that the whole population in the economy can 
be represented by a representative agent with rational expectations who tries to maximize 
expected utility at any given period subject to inter-temporal budget constraint. It is as if one 
person‟s thought can be used to represent the way in which everyone else in the entire 
economy thinks. Clearly, the model ignores the interaction among different agents 
comprising the economy and positive feedback which could cause emergent phenomena.  
 By looking superficially, the assumption about human rationality might seem to make 
sense. However, any sane person might be shocked into disbelief if he/she finds out about the 
thought process of the representative agent with rational expectations before making a 
decision. This is very interesting because, as of today, many scholars still employ this 
assumption as a building block for their models whether it is a DSGE type or not.
10
 
Beinhocker (2007) provides a very vivid example about the thought process of a 
representative agent with rational expectations before making any decisions. Imagine a 
representative agent in the DSGE model walks into a local grocery store and sees some 
tomatoes. If you are a representative agent with rational expectations as the DSGE model 
assumes, the followings are your logical thought process while deciding whether or not to 
buy tomatoes.  
 First, you have a well-defined preference for tomatoes compared with everything else 
in the world you could possibly buy. Beinhocker uses bread, milk, and a vacation in Spain as 
examples. In addition, you have well-defined preferences for everything you could buy at any 
point in the future. Since the future is uncertain, you have to assign probabilities to those 
potential purchases. For instance, you might anticipate that there is a 23% chance that, in the 
next two years, the shelf in your kitchen will come loose and you will need to pay US$ 1.20 
                                                          
10
 For example, please see Whitelaw (2000), Pongsaparn (2008), Tanboon (2008), Bekaert et al. 
(2009), Drechsler and Yaron (2009), Bonomo et al. (2010), Sbordone et al. (2010), Foerster et al. 
(2013), Davig and Foerster (2014), and Durongkaveroj (2014). 
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to buy some bolts to fix it. The discounted present value of US$ 1.20 is about US$ 1.00, 
multiplied by a 23% probability, equals an expected value of 23 cents for possible future 
repairs, which you must trade off with your potential purchase of tomatoes today, along with 
all of your other potential purchases in your lifetime. In the DSGE model, all your well-
defined preferences are also ordered very logically. For example, if you prefer tomatoes to 
carrots, and prefer carrots to green beans, you will always take tomatoes over green beans.  
 In the DSGE model, it assumes that you know exactly what your budget constraint is 
for spending on tomatoes. To calculate this budget, you must have fully formed expectations 
of your future earnings over your entire lifetime and have optimized your current budget 
based on that knowledge. You might not buy those tomatoes because you know that the 
money spent on them could be better spent in your retirement. The model also assumes that 
your future earnings will be invested in a perfectly hedged portfolio of financial assets and 
that you already take into account actuarial calculations on the probability that you will live 
until retirement at the age of sixty-five, as well as your expectations of future interest rates, 
inflation, and the yen-to-dollar exchange rate.  
 While you are standing in the grocery store, looking at those nice, red tomatoes, you 
then feed all these information into your mind and perform an incredibly complex 
optimization calculation that trades off all these factors, and come up with the perfectly 
optimal answer - to buy or not to buy tomatoes! 
 It is quite obvious that no one would do this kind of analysis while deciding whether 
or not to buy goods and services. According to Simon (1983), no human being would be able 
to perform such a complex calculation. It is being treated by traditional economics as if 
human beings perform such complex task while, in reality, no one does. Even if there were 
9 
 
one
11
, there is still a limitation in the sense that this kind of analysis would require an infinite 
amount of information in order to perform such calculation. In the real world, the cognitive 
capacities of human are bounded and abilities to memorize facts and to perform complicated 
logical analyses are very limited as argued by Helbing and Balietti (2010). Helbing and 
Balietti also note that this is a non-deterministic polynomial-time hard problem (N-P hard 
problem) even computers are facing limits where optimization cannot be performed. Axelrod 
(1997) has long noted that the reason for the dominance of assumption about human 
rationality is not that scholars think it is realistic. Rather, it allows for deduction. Axelrod 
views that this unrealistic assumption undermines much of its value as a basis for advice. 
Besides Axelrod (1997), Simon (1983) and Helbing and Balietti (2010), a number of 
psychologists, neuroscientists, and behavioral economists, as well as scholars and 
practitioners from various disciplines have argued in similar fashion.
12
 
 The critical point is that if the assumptions about the equilibrium state of the 
economy, the external shock as the only factor that causes the economic system out of 
equilibrium, and the representative agent with rational expectations as imposed in the DSGE 
model are not close to what happen in reality, then any estimated impacts of policies on the 
economy and/or economic forecasts coming out of this model, even if they are correct, must 
be a coincidence, not because of skills of the analysts based on their scientific knowledge of 
reality. In fact, if one compares economic forecasts using the DSGE model and actual 
numbers, one would find that they are not very close, and most of the time when that 
happens, external factors always take the blame, not skills of the forecasters.
13
 The Economist 
                                                          
11
 From the viewpoint of Buchanan (2013), that person might be insane.  
12
 For example, please see Kahneman and Tversky (1981), Thaler (1994), Ariely (2009), Bardsley et 
al. (2010), McClure (2011), Santos (2011), McFadden (2013), Sutherland (2014), Fiske (2015), Haidt 
(2015), Knutson (2015), Levi (2015), Pentland (2015), Slingerland (2015), and The World Bank 
(2015) for criticisms about human rationality as assumed in traditional economics.  
13
 Ormerod (2012) criticizes that despite apparent intellectual advances of the DSGE model, 
forecasters continue to make the same mistakes since 1970s. 
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points out that the DSGE model was a poor guide to the origin of the financial crisis and left 
its followers unprepared for the symptoms (The Economist, 2009). Kirman (2010) also 
argues that if the DSGE proponents think that their models are useful for understanding how 
economy works, then they should be able to explain why their models do not allow for the 
possibility of a crisis. If major crises are a recurrent feature of the economy as documented by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), then the DSGE model should incorporate this possibility.  
 Based on the reasons discussed above, this paper argues that if macroeconomics 
wants to progress, the DSGE model along with its assumptions about the equilibrium state of 
the economy, the exogenous shock as the only force that causes the economic system out of 
equilibrium, as well as the representative agent with rational expectations have to be 
abandoned and replaced with a better model and more realistic assumptions.  
 While the drawbacks of macroeconomics are due mainly to the model and 
assumptions, the problem in finance has to do with assumptions. There are two assumptions 
this paper chooses to discuss. The first assumption often imposed in finance is that price 
changes are independent. One could think of tossing a fair coin as a metaphor. The results 
coming out of a coin tossing are independent from each other. The coin does not have a 
memory whether it landed head or tail in the past. The second assumption is about the 
distribution of data. Most financial models and tools assume that data are normally 
distributed.
14
 Ho Ho pointed out that we can only find these two statistical properties of 
financial data in our dreams.
15
 Fernandez (2015) also views these two assumptions as absurd. 
In reality, changes in prices are not independent. Financial data have a property of path 
dependence or long memory. Normally, big changes are followed by big changes, the so-
                                                          
14
 Capital asset pricing model, efficient market hypothesis, and Black-Scholes option pricing formula 
are prime examples of such models and tools. 
15
 Comment given at the 4
th
 Annual National Asset-Liability Management Conference, Singapore, 
July 7, 2011. 
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called clustered volatility
16
, but it is very difficult to predict whether it is going up or down. 
Benoit Mandelbrot notes that if each change in price, whether a five-cent uptick or a US$ 26 
collapse, appears independently from the last, and price changes last week or last year do not 
influence those today, it would mean any information that could be used to predict 
tomorrow‟s price is contained in today‟s price. In that case, there is no need to study 
historical charts.
17
 
 In addition to the assumption that price changes are independent which is not 
consistent with empirical observations, financial data do not follow normal distribution as 
assumed in modern finance. Rather, it exhibits power law distribution with fat tails. 
According to Haldane and Nelson (2012), the power law distribution with fat tails implies 
that the probability of large events decreases polynomially with their size while, in the 
normal distribution world, the probability of large events declines exponentially with their 
size, making large events increasingly rare at a rapid rate. In contrast, under power law 
distribution, these large events are much more likely.  
 To provide a numerical example of how risky it might be if one assumes normality of 
distribution of data, this paper refers to a study conducted by Benoit Mandelbrot using daily 
index movement of Dow Jones Industrial Average during the period of 1916-2003.
 18
 Based 
on Mandelbrot‟s empirical findings, normal distribution implies that there should be fifty-
eight days when the Dow moves more than 3.4% while in fact there are one thousand and 
one. In addition, normal distribution predicts six days where the Index swings beyond 4.5% 
whereas there are three hundred and sixty-six days according to the empirical observations. 
And lastly, the Index that swings more than 7% should come once every three hundred 
                                                          
16
 According to Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009), clustered volatility is referred to the fact that there 
are substantial and strongly temporally correlated changes in the size of price movements at different 
point in time. 
17
 Mandelbrot and Hudson (2008). 
18
 Ibid. 
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thousand years as predicted by normal distribution while the twentieth century already 
observed forty-eight days. It is crystal clear based on this empirical evidence that assuming 
that data have normal distribution would highly underestimate risk. It is so worried that, 
nowadays, many people both in academic and in practice have yet to realize about these 
limitations and continue to teach or do their business as if nothing has happened over the past 
eight years.  
 This paper views that these are serious issues that cannot be taken for granted. The 
failures in macroeconomics and finance, according to Helbing and Balietti (2010), are not a 
matter of approximations which often lead to the right understanding but wrong numbers. 
Rather, it concerns fundamental errors in the sense that certain conclusions following from 
these models along with their unrealistic assumptions are seriously misleading. As the recent 
financial crisis in the U.S. has demonstrated, such errors in macroeconomics and finance can 
be extremely costly, US$ 4-20 trillion based on the number estimated by Helbing (2009).   
 How should the disciplines of macroeconomics and finance be changed in order to 
avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future?  This leads to the third topic of this paper 
where it introduces the concept of complexity science. This paper argues that this new 
approach has strong potential and should be the direction that macroeconomics and finance 
should move towards. 
III. Complexity Science as an Alternative Approach to Understand the Workings of 
Economy and Financial Market 
 Complexity science is a branch of science that studies properties of complex systems. 
Examples of complex systems are earthquake, sand pile avalanche, forest fire, weather 
system, ecosystem, food web, epidemics, traffic flows, neuron network, social network, 
modern political uprising, financial market, and socio-economic system. If one observes these 
13 
 
systems, one would find that they are characterized by interactions of elements comprising 
the systems. These interactions, either directly or indirectly, are highly non-linear and tend to 
be dynamic and probabilistic with positive feedback
19
 which often generates surprises or 
emergent phenomena that a single element in the system would not be able to do or create it 
on its own
20
 (Holland, 1996).
 
Mitchell (2009) defines complex system as a system in which 
large networks of components with no central control and simple rules of operation can give 
rise to complex collective behaviour, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via 
learning or evolution. According to Mitchell, in such a system where organized behaviour 
arises from the bottom up without an internal or external controller or central planner are 
called self-organizing.
21
 Since simple rules produce complex behaviour in hard-to-predict 
ways, the macroscopic behaviour of such system is called emergent. 
 Given characteristics of complex system as described above, it is very difficult or 
impossible to predict what is going to happen in the complex system, making it difficult to 
control and prevent the event from happening. In addition, it is not very easy to find the true 
cause of the event in the complex system. For example, in nature, when an avalanche occurs, 
one cannot blame a single snowflake. Likewise, an extremely volatile movement in a stock 
market, the so-called flash crash in the modern era, could happen for no special reason.
22
 
Moreover, financial and economic crises could arise locally from the interactions of agents 
                                                          
19
 According to Oxford Dictionaries, positive feedback is the enhancing or amplification of an effect 
by its own influence on the process which gives rise to it. This process occurs in a feedback loop in 
which a small initial disturbance on the system could lead to an increase in the magnitude of the 
perturbation. 
20
 This implies that the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts. 
21
 It should be noted that, in general, complex system needs no designed but, nonetheless, can be 
designed. Urban planning and development is one example of designed complex systems. 
22
 This could be illustrated by closed experiment based on the El Farol Problem and the Minority 
Game where the winners in the experiment are the minority. The author of this paper has conducted a 
number of closed experiments over the years and the results are always qualitatively similar in the 
sense that the ratio of persons who are in minority group always fluctuates, sometimes excessively, 
without any presence of external factors or special reasons. For further readings regarding the El Farol 
Problem and the Minority Game, please see Arthur (1994), Challet and Zhang (1997), Ball (2005), 
Beinhocker (2007), and Buchanan (2013).  
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making up the system but none of them can really be held responsible for such crises as 
argued by Kirman (2010).  
 Another interesting thing that we can learn from the characteristic of complex system 
is that while the event is happening, it is very difficult to tell how and when it is going to end. 
Furthermore, assessing the impact of the event while it is not fully finished could give a 
wrong picture about the size of the impact since it could be quite different. The losses from 
tsunami in Japan and the damages from flood in Thailand both in 2011 should provide good 
examples of characteristics that complex systems share in common. The same is true for 
financial and economic crises. We have yet to know how and when the problems in the U.S. 
economy and in some European countries are going to end and probably lost count the 
magnitude of losses resulting from the 2007 U.S. financial crisis. 
 It should also be noted that complex system exhibits path dependence where history 
matters. Path dependence along with highly non-linear relationship among elements 
comprising the system would make the system very sensitive to initial state. A small change 
in the initial state could lead to totally different outcome through positive feedback. This is 
known as the butterfly effect coined by a meteorologist named Edward Lorenz.
23
 A flap of 
butterfly‟s wings in Brazil could cause a tornado in Texas. Likewise, a bankruptcy of one 
financial institution could cause the world financial system to collapse, often times without 
any warnings.  
 According to Haldane and Nelson (2012), complex system could organize itself to a 
fragile state. Bak (1996) calls this state self-organized criticality and uses sand pile avalanche 
to explain this phenomenon. Imagine dropping a grain of sand one by one on the flat surface. 
As more grains are added, the pile builds up. At some point, adding another grain would 
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 For further reading about the butterfly effect, please see Lorenz (1995). 
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cause the pile to collapse. Sand pile reaches its self-organized critical state. Haldane and 
Nelson (2012) argue that the build-up to the 2007 U.S. financial crisis has the same 
characteristic as that of sand pile avalanche.  
A competitive search for yield among financial firms caused them to increase 
risk to hit return targets. The sand pile of returns grew ever-higher as the 
system self-organized on a high-risk state. Having reached this critical state, a 
small addition of risk - a single subprime grain of sand - was sufficient to 
cause the whole edifice to collapse in an uncontrolled cascade.  
 Haldane and Nelson (2012) also note that the size of sand pile avalanches and the 
magnitude of losses due to financial crises, like most things happening in natural, social, 
economic, and financial systems, namely, the monthly total rainfall, the intensity of solar 
flares, the magnitude of earthquakes, the number of citations, the frequency of occurrence of 
words in a book, the number of population in cities, income distribution, as well as annual 
real bank loan growth and real GDP growth among different countries, are observed to have 
power law distributions with fat tails.  
 Mathematically speaking, power law distribution of a given variable describes an 
inverse relationship between the size of that variable and its frequency.
24
 The existence of 
power law distributions among variables in natural, social, economic, and financial systems 
indicates that small events are more common than large ones. However, the interesting 
characteristic of power law distribution is that it is scale-independence which means that the 
events of all sizes can be generated by the same process. For example, the biggest and most 
infrequent earthquakes are created by the same processes that produce hordes of tiny ones. 
                                                          
24
 The mathematical form of power law distribution is P(X > x) ~ x
-
. That is the probability of a 
random variable X exceeds some level x is proportional to 1/x

, suggesting that the probability of 
large events decays polynomially with their size. 
16 
 
Likewise, the occasional stock market crashes are generated by the same internal dynamics of 
the marketplace that produce daily movements in stock prices (Ball, 2012).
25
 This makes it 
hard to predict how small or large any particular event will become. All we can say is that 
large event is less frequent than small one, nothing more. 
 Given characteristics of power law distribution as described above, it implies that one 
cannot use mean as an estimate for the size of the future event and cannot use variance or 
standard deviation to measure the risk associated with that event since these estimates are not 
well defined.
26
 Thus, the average size of avalanche is not helpful in predicting the size of the 
next avalanche. Neither is the variance useful as a measure of the size distribution of the 
avalanches. This is similar to what happen in financial and economic crises where average 
loss of previous crises is not a good predictor for the loss of the next crisis. Nor is variance 
useful for macroeconomic and financial risk management. Alan Greenspan notes that each 
crisis is different and none of them will look alike.
27
 
 By viewing financial and economic systems from the lens of complexity science, it is 
clear that this alternative approach provides far superior descriptions of how the financial 
market and the economy work than those postulated in the DSGE model and in modern 
finance theories. Flake (1998) argues that, considering an economist who builds a model of 
the economy on a computer and reaches the conclusion that interest rates, unemployment, 
inflation, and GDP growth will all reach a constant level at the end of the year and stay that 
way forever, it is obvious that this model tells us very little about how the real world works 
because the model fails to capture an important aspect of the real world. Instead, supposing a 
model is built in such a way that it never reaches equilibrium, turns out to be extremely 
                                                          
25
 These two examples suggest that they are not outliers or one-off events.   
26
 One way to detect whether or not mean and variance have any useful meanings is by adding a 
single observation into the sample. If that single observation completely alters the estimates of mean 
and variance of the sample, then mean and variance are not very useful. 
27
 Comment given during the interview for BBC 2.  
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sensitive to the starting conditions, and displays surprisingly complex behaviour, even if this 
model fails to make actual predictions about the real economy, it still has some predictive 
power since it may reveal a deeper truth about the inherent difficulty of predicting the 
economy.  
 Building such a dynamic non-equilibrium model of economic system or any other 
complex system and then testing the conclusions of the model against real world observations 
are no longer beyond our reach. Given the advances of computing power of computer and of 
knowledge in computer science for the past few decades, scholars and practitioners from 
various disciplines are now able to analyze, explain, and predict characteristics and 
behaviours of complex systems by using computer simulation models. Examples of well-
known computer simulation models are agent-based or individual-based models.
28
  
 According to Railsback and Grimm (2012), agent-based or individual-based models 
are models where individuals or agents are described as unique and autonomous that usually 
interact with each other and their environment locally. Agents may be organisms, humans, 
businesses, institutions, and any other entity that pursue a certain goal. Being unique implies 
that agents usually are different from each other in such characteristics as size, location, 
resource reserves, and history. Interacting locally means that agents usually do not interact 
with all other agents but only with their neighbours in geographic space or in some other kind 
of space such as a network. Being autonomous implies that agents act independently of each 
other and pursue their own objectives. Organisms strive to survive and reproduce. Traders in 
the stock market try to make money. Businesses have goals such as meeting profit targets and 
staying in business. Regulatory authorities want to enforce laws and provide public well-
being. Agents therefore use adaptive behaviour and adjust their behaviour to current states of 
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 For further readings about agent-based modeling, please see Axelrod (1997), Flake (1998), Helbing 
(2012), and Railsback and Grimm (2012). 
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themselves, of other agents, and of their environment. The main advantage of the agent-based 
model is that it can address problems concerning emergence that arises from individual 
agents, each with simple rules, interacting and responding to each other and to their 
environment and that results from bottom-up and self-organized processes, not top-down 
directions.
29
 
 Given characteristics of complex system and models to analyze its properties using 
computer simulation, how could financial regulators, financial analysts, and macroeconomic 
policy makers benefit from understanding the nature of complex systems? Section IV 
discusses this issue. 
IV. Implications of Complexity Science for Macroeconomic and Financial Uncertainty 
Management   
 First of all, since complex systems are characterized by highly non-linear interactions 
among elements comprising the systems, they normally follow power law distribution with 
fat tails. Understanding this characteristic of complex system should help financial analysts, 
financial regulators, and policy makers be more careful when pricing financial products 
and/or conducting risk analysis. If done well, it could help lower the chance of financial and 
economic crises in the future. It is important to note that this does not mean that crisis will 
not happen again but the chance of happening could be reduced.  
 Another implication from complexity science is that an excessively volatile financial 
market could happen for no special reason. Simply an unnoticeable internal interactions 
among participants in the market could result in this phenomenon via a butterfly effect. For 
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 Helbing (2009) notes that since complex systems cannot be controlled in conventional way like 
pressing a button or steering a car, top-down control attempts will usually fail. The right approach to 
influence behaviours in complex systems is to come up with rules that support and strengthen the self-
organization and self-control of the systems so that coordination and cooperation in complex systems 
will appear by themselves without specifying what exactly each element in the systems should do. 
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those who rely on fundamental analysis, understanding this characteristic of complex 
financial market would save time searching for external factors that might cause volatility in 
the market. 
 In addition, given the characteristic of emergence in complex financial and economic 
systems, regulators and policy makers must understand that, instead of spending time and 
effort in designing measures to prevent financial and economic crises, they should focus on 
mitigating measures since these crises cannot be prevented in the first place. Mandelbrot 
notes that after each financial and/or economic crisis, authorities always try to come up with 
new or adjusted rules and regulations in hope that these new or adjusted rules and regulations 
could help prevent the next crisis without realizing that this cannot be done.
30
  
 Rather than imposing rules and regulations with an aim to prevent the next crisis, this 
paper suggests that financial regulators and policy makers should explore how the immune 
system detects and kills pathogens without harming the body and apply that knowledge in 
designing rules and regulations to mitigate and/or eliminate problems after the financial 
market or economic system is being hit by the crisis. Thus far, a number of scholars and 
practitioners have begun to design economic and financial systems based on the insights from 
biology, ecology, as well as natural and life sciences. For example, the Bank of England, in 
cooperation with scientists, has started to draw comparisons between biological systems, with 
their complicated webs of interactions between all the different species, with the interactions 
between different banks and financial institutions (Durrani, 2011). Haldane and May (2011) 
explore the interplay between complexity and stability in financial networks by drawing 
analogies from the dynamics of ecological food webs and with networks within which 
infectious diseases spread. Helbing (2015) recommends that new economic system thinking 
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should develop non-equilibrium network models that capture self-organized dynamics of real 
economic system. In addition, it should be an interdisciplinary approach that takes into 
account complex, ecological, and social system thinkings. 
 Furthermore, regulators and policy makers must understand that, in complex systems, 
rare event is not unusual but norm.
31
 Understanding this could help them prepare for the rare 
event by taking it into account when conducting risk analysis. Taleb (2013) suggests that this 
could be done by not considering the worst case scenario in the past but realizing that even 
worse outcome is possible and then adopting a redundancy strategy. Examples of redundancy 
strategy are maintaining extra reserves or savings, pursuing budget surplus, purchasing some 
forms of insurance, and hedging using financial derivatives. This is very critical for liability 
management. Taleb (2012) argues that if one has debt, one needs to be very accurate in 
his/her prediction about the future. By adopting redundancy strategy, it should immune the 
person from prediction errors.
32
 The same can be applied for financial regulators and policy 
makers. For example, if the government runs a budget surplus and has accumulated a lot of 
savings, there is no need to predict the cause of the next crisis. This is because if a crisis does 
happen, it would be assured that the financial market and the economy are protected to some 
extent. Although they might be hit, the financial market and the economy should be in a 
relatively better position than those that have debts and are managed by people who do not 
understand characteristics of complex financial market and economic system and how they 
function. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task because financial market and economic 
system as we just learnt from complexity science that they are unpredictable and difficult-to-
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 This is due to the characteristic of power law distribution of variables in complex systems. 
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 It is worth to note that redundancy is an important characteristic of nature that human beings should 
learn to emulate. We could survive with one kidney but nature gives us two. Some plants produce 
millions of pollen grains but most of them end up in our noses. A frog lays thousands of eggs but not 
all of them hatch into tadpoles, let alone, metamorphose into adult frogs. By creating debt, human 
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control even if we know how they work. The current financial crisis clearly demonstrates that 
we still do not know the workings of financial market and economic system very well.  
 Given the unpredictable and difficult-to-control nature of financial and economic 
systems, risk managers both in private and in public sectors should be prepared to deal with 
unexpected events that complex financial market and economic system will bring forth. What 
risk managers could do in a complex and adaptive financial and economic ecology is to check 
the environment very often and try to adjust strategies accordingly. More importantly, they 
must understand that they should not try to predict or determine behavior of a complex 
adaptive system, but to expect the most probable possibilities. This will make it easier for 
them to adapt when things go off the course. Because then, they are ready to expect the 
unexpected (Gershenson and Heylighen, 2004).  
 This paper views that the task of risk managers can be metaphorically compared to the 
task of performer walking on a high-wire across canyon. The performer has to constantly 
check the surrounding environment and tries to adjust and balance him/herself in order to 
avoid falling to the ground.
33
 The key difference is that, in the world of high-wire walking, 
when things go badly, performers could be seriously injured or lost their lives but, in the 
financial world, risk managers get massive bonuses at the expense of tax payers! 
V. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Direction of Macroeconomics and Finance  
 In sum, the failures of existing knowledge in macroeconomics and finance in 
explaining and predicting economic and financial phenomena are mainly due to models and 
unrealistic assumptions these disciplines employ. This paper argues that the assumptions 
regarding equilibrium state of the economy, the exogenous shocks as the only factor that can 
push the economic system out of equilibrium, the representative agent with rational 
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expectations as widely used in macroeconomics and the assumptions about independent 
changes in variables and normal distribution usually imposed in finance have (wrongly) 
guided economists, financial analysts, as well as policy makers into the illusions that the 
economy and financial market could be directed and controlled, and hence, made them 
unaware and unprepared for the abrupt changes.  
 In order for macroeconomics and finance to make progress, these knowledge have to 
be abandoned and replaced by other scientific methods and tools that could deal with 
complexity of macro-economy and financial market. This paper introduces complexity 
science as an alternative approach as well as the agent-based model which can be used to 
analyze and understand how economy and financial market function. It also discusses key 
important characteristics of complex system and the workings of agent-based model that 
economists, financial analysts, financial regulators, and policy makers must realize and 
include in their analyses. If done well, this paper believes that it would not only advance our 
understanding about the workings of economy and financial market but also reduce the 
chance of making mistakes that could cause economic and financial crises.  
 In addition, according to the United Nations (2013), the financial system has to be 
redirected towards promoting access to long-term financing for investments required to 
achieve sustainable development. This paper views the issue of sustainable development as 
one of the major challenges for regulators and policy makers in the years to come.
34
 This 
paper agrees with Foxton et al. (2013) that, to achieve the goal of sustainable financial and 
socio-economic systems, regulators and policy makers must recognize that the existing 
knowledge in macroeconomics and finance as argued in this paper are not just irrelevant but 
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positively harmful when the need is for systemic shifts in financial and socio-economic 
trajectories, and employ the knowledge from complexity science for their analyses. 
 However, we should realize that, in sciences, any significant changes in knowledge 
would take time simply because it is very difficult or almost impossible to convince those 
who believe that the earth is the center of the universe to see otherwise. But sooner or later 
this has to be changed. It is better to be sooner rather than later. 
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